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The Wisconsin Card Sorting Test (WCST) evaluates a subject’s ability to shift to a new
pattern of behavior in response to the presentation of unexpected negative feedback.
The present study introduces a novel version of the traditional WCST by integrating
a probabilistic component into its traditional rule shifting to add uncertainty to the
task, as well as the option to forage for information during any particular trial. These
changes transformed a task that is trivial for neurotypical individuals into a challenging
environment useful for evaluating biases and compensatory strategizing. Sixty subjects
performed the probabilistic WCST at four uncertainty levels to determine the effect of
uncertainty on subject performance and strategy. Results revealed that increasing the
level of uncertainty during a run of trials correlated with a reduction in rational strategizing
in favor of both random choice and information foraging, evoking biases and suboptimal
strategies such as satisfaction of search, negativity bias, and probability matching.
Keywords: decision-making, Wisconsin Card Sorting Test, cognitive biases, probability matching, uncertainty
INTRODUCTION
Dating back to 1948, David Grant and Esta Berg’s Wisconsin Card Sorting Test (WCST) is a task
that is commonly used in assessing the ability to “set-shift,” or change one’s way of thinking in
the face of new goals or stimuli (Grant and Berg, 1948; Bishara et al., 2010). This task is useful
in studying, modeling, and diagnosing disorders in higher-level processing areas of the brain
such as the prefrontal cortex (Milner, 1963; Robinson et al., 1980; Dehaene and Changeux, 1991;
Rougier and O’Reilly, 2002; Lie et al., 2006; Nyhus and Barceló, 2009). In the WCST, a subject is
presented with one reference card and three to four choice cards. Each card contains an image with
a particular shape, color, and number of items, and is designed such that each choice card’s feature
expressions are mutually exclusive. Every choice card matches a diﬀerent feature of the reference
card. In each trial, one feature is selected as the “rule,” and the objective is to select a card that
matches the rule for the reference card. For example, if the rule is green, the correct choice would
be the card that contained green items, irrespective of the number or shape of items on that card.
TheWCST consists of several iterations of trials that use the same rule, followed by a rule shift that
requires subjects to change their behavior.
With the goal of evoking and quantifying changes in strategizing, behavior, and biases due
to uncertainty, we developed a modiﬁed version of the WCST called the probabilistic WCST
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(pWCST). pWCST incorporates an element of uncertainty in the
form of a probabilistic rule selection, and an option to forage
for information by observing a trial. Each trial has a set of three
probabilities corresponding to the likelihood that a particular
feature will be the rule. For example, the rule could be dictated
by a 90% chance of shape, 7% chance of color, and 3% chance
of number of items. These probability distributions are referred
to as the Top, Middle, and Bottom rules, respectively, and these
base percentages are referred to as the “ground truth probability
distribution” in the paper. Because humans are oftentimes shown
to make irrational decisions regarding probabilistic assessment
in the face of uncertainty, incorporating a varying degree of
uncertainty into the WCST adapts the task into a tool that can be
used to evoke and quantify the degree of change in behavior that
is introduced into the decision-making process for unpredictable
events.We hypothesize that by increasing the level of uncertainty
in the WCST task, we will evoke biases and strategic changes in
subjects that correlate to the degree of uncertainty.
Card-based tasks in the past have been common for assessing
the patterns of balancing exploration and exploitation (Hoehn
et al., 2005; Worthy et al., 2007; Sang et al., 2011), both
for testing diminishing resources as would be experienced
in real world explore/exploit tasks, and for understanding
the underlying probability in action choices. The element of
information foraging is commonly studied using decision-
making experiments, often utilizing a probabilistic task, although
to our knowledge, theWCST has not been previously modiﬁed to
accommodate this mechanism. Introducing uncertainty into the
WCST has been explored in a previous study by Wilson and Niv
(2012). Wilson and Niv (2012) used the WCST in conjunction
with a Bayesian model in order to examine the methods by
which humans decide what information to learn in a changing
environment.
The present study moves beyond Wilson and Niv’s paradigm
with the addition to “Observe” a trial (i.e., to collect information
without aﬀecting one’s score). While Wilson and Niv kept
task uncertainty ﬁxed, the present study investigates the eﬀect
of a variable level of uncertainty, which is hypothesized to
aﬀect both Observe behavior and strategy usage. The Observe
feature introduced in the pWCST allows the subject to explore
potential payoﬀs rather than exploit immediate gains. This adds
an alternate option, similar to no-choice utility (Howes et al.,
2015), to the classical explore/exploit tradeoﬀ where subjects
can practice alternate strategies in a subsequent choice phase.
Another recent similar task of note is the probabilistic lights task
utilized by Navarro and Newell testing the theory that humans
tend to assume a higher underlying rate of change than the
ground truth probability distribution during a probabilistic task
(2014). In this task, subjects were told to predict which of two
lights would come on, given that only one would light up on
each trial. In the dynamic condition, subjects were told that the
bias on these two lights could randomly change, and in the static
condition, the bias was to stay the same. In both conditions, the
bias was always 70 and 30%, with a 1.6% chance of switching in
the dynamic condition. Subjects were allowed to either Observe
or Bet on each trial, with Observe allowing them to test their
response without gaining or losing points, while Betting would
result in a change in points. Results showed that in both static
and dynamic conditions, subjects signiﬁcantly overestimated
the amount of switching that occurred, which conﬁrmed the
hypothesis and suggested that it wasmore costly to underestimate
a rate of change than overestimate. Similarly to the pWCST,
subjects were allowed to Observe trials without any point gain or
loss, as an alternative to betting their real points. While Navarro
and Newell’s task adequately probed subject Observe behavior,
the pWCST takes this task paradigm further in the inclusion of
diﬀering probability distributions, adding a level of uncertainty
that cannot be directly tested in the probabilistic lights task.
Additionally, the introduction of varying probability levels allows
for the investigation of eﬀects due to probability magnitudes,
potentially identifying overweighting and underweighting eﬀects,
as well as diﬀerences in the level of Observe reliance.
Cognitive biases are deviations from normative strategies that
occur both consciously and unconsciously in human decision
making to quickly and eﬃciently cope with uncertainty or task
diﬃculty. While these biases can lead to non-optimal action
decisions (Tversky and Kahneman, 1974) it has also been shown
that such biases, under the right circumstances, can result in near-
optimal task performance, designating them, not as irrational, but
as “bounded rational” behavior (Gigerenzer andGoldstein, 1996).
Therefore, these biases are interesting to study both for their
commentary on shortcomings of human decision-making, as well
as their insight into conscious and subconscious techniques that
allow for fast and frugal yet high-yielding processes for creating
action decisions. The decision-making behaviors of interest,
including cognitive biases, heuristics, and non-optimal/bounded
rational strategies, in the present paper include negativity bias,
probability matching, and satisfaction of search, all of which the
pWCST is expected to evoke, that would not be expected in the
traditional WCST.
Negativity bias is the unbalanced increase in salience of
negative over positive feedback (Ito et al., 1998; Carretié
et al., 2001; Rozin and Royzman, 2001; Vaish et al., 2008).
Negativity bias may have adapted by allowing humans to focus
more on information that was potentially harmful rather than
helpful, as neglecting harmful information is more likely to
shorten one’s lifespan. However, the presence of negativity bias,
through prioritizing avoiding negative behavior patterns, could
potentially delay or prevent time spent on the development of
positive behavior patterns. The present pWCST is hypothesized
to evoke negativity bias while WCST would not, as pWCST is
inherently more challenging due to the probabilistic rule, and in
higher uncertainty levels, is expected to lead to higher amounts
of negative feedback. This may result in subjects spending more
time foraging for information when they feel they are receiving
too much negative feedback resulting from their choices.
In probability matching behavior, an individual will perform
actions that roughly mirror the underlying probability structure
inherent in a task environment (Vulkan, 2000; Shanks et al.,
2002; Wozny et al., 2010). Probability matching can occur in
situations where it is advantageous to explore options rather than
exploit the best choice. When a subject feels uncomfortable with
their ability to identify and exploit the most valuable option,
subjects may revert to probabilistic search for information about
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the rules of their present task (Gaissmaier and Schooler, 2008).
Probability matching is another suboptimal decision framework
that pWCST is expected to evoke where WCST would not, as
it is a behavioral strategy that is employed during situations in
which the subject receives probabilistic payoﬀ, a novel inclusion
in the pWCST paradigm.We hypothesize that subjects will utilize
probability matching as a means to cope with the uncertain
environment in the pWCST, rather than the optimal strategy
of continuously selecting the highest probability feature. During
periods of moderate uncertainty, we expect subjects to use the
Observe option to derive the “expected uncertainty” from a block
of trials (Yu and Dayan, 2005).
In satisfaction of search, the individual possesses a threshold
at which they determine they have collected enough information
for their task (Fleck et al., 2010; Simons, 2010). As conﬁrmatory
evidence is acquired, less evidence is required from the
information foraging process, which is a heuristic that can
save time and energy but is not inherently rational (Gigerenzer
and Goldstein, 1996). Having preconceived notions about the
underlying nature of a task is in itself a bias, and when
those notions are accompanied by conﬁrming evidence that is
determined by a probability rather than a static metric, these
biases become compounded. We hypothesize that, during higher
uncertainty levels, the satisfaction of search threshold will be
higher than in lower uncertainty levels. This may be due to
a resulting increase of conﬂicting information necessitating a
larger sample size to reach the same level of conﬁdence. The
pWCST allows for the opportunity to study satisfaction of search
where the WCST would not, owing to the inclusion of an
option that allows for risk-free information foraging. Through
the incorporation of the Observe option, we predict that the
satisfaction of search threshold (i.e., the number of Observe trials
necessary for a subject to be conﬁdent enough in their rule
beliefs to cease foraging) will be higher under higher uncertainty
conditions.
Win-Stay-Lose-Shift (WSLS), a strategy commonly used in
game theory (Nowak and Sigmund, 1993; Imhof et al., 2007)
involving staying with an action following its successful use and
shifting to another action following its unsuccessful use, was
selected for strategic assessment alongside probability matching
during the pWCST. These strategies were chosen for comparative
analysis in order to provide reasonable baselines for subject
performance that realistically encompassed biases, suboptimal
strategizing, and human limitations. While probability matching
and WSLS behaviors are formal strategies that lead to positive
performance in the pWCST, the pWCST is akin to a multi-
armed bandit task (Lee et al., 2011) coupled with the WCST as a
result of the introduced probabilistic component. In the pWCST,
optimal task performance consists of always selecting the highest
probability feature.
MATERIALS AND METHODS
Human Participants
Sixty subjects (ages 18–25) were recruited in two sessions of
30 subjects through an online database maintained by the
Experimental Social Science Laboratory (ESSL) at the University
of California, Irvine (UCI). This database is comprised of UCI’s
undergraduate and graduate student population that have agreed
to participate in computer experiments based in social and
economic decision-making conducted by members of the School
of Social Sciences and aﬃliated organizations. Subjects were
not selected using background characteristics (age, race, gender)
other than their student status. Subjects participating in the
second session were prescreened to ensure that they had not
previously participated in the experiment. Experimental protocol
was reviewed and approved by the UCI Institutional Review
Board, and informed consent was obtained from all participants.
Experimental Design
Subject data was collected using desktop PCs within the ESSL.
Prior to the experiment, subjects were instructed on the basic
structure of the task, the payment system consisting of a baseline
amount plus an incentive sum reliant on their performance, and
their right to cease participation without penalty for any reason
at any time. Subjects then participated in two behavioral tasks,
the pWCST and a version of the Wason Selection Task, a similar
decision-making task also investigating biases and compensatory
strategizing related to uncertainty, in a randomly assigned order.
The Wason task will not be discussed further in this paper,
as it is the subject of a separate analysis. Each behavioral task
incorporated a brief tutorial to train subjects on the tasks, as
well as inform them that the rule involved in the tasks would
change throughout the experiment. Subjects were not, however,
informed that the rule sets they would encounter would be
probabilistic, in an eﬀort to preserve unprejudiced strategizing in
the face of unreliable feedback.
Upon completion of both tasks, subjects received a $7 ﬂat rate
for participation, as well as compensation dependent on their
performance in both tasks. The rate of compensation for WCST
was $0.02 per point, with a minimum performance-based payout
of $2. Total payments ranged from $10 to $30.
Probabilistic Wisconsin Card Sorting
Test (pWCST)
Subjects played a total of 550 pWCST games, which were
split into 11 blocks of 50 games each. There were four block
types – No, Low, Moderate, and High uncertainty – all of
which were presented three times each except High, which
was only presented twice as a result of the block order. The
probability sets associated with each block type are listed in
Table 1, and the order of the blocks is listed in Table 2. The
ﬁrst third of the condition presentation order was designed to
TABLE 1 | Probability sets for Wisconsin Card Sorting Test (WCST).
Uncertainty Top rule Middle rule Bottom rule
No 100% 0% 0%
Low 90% 7% 3%
Moderate 75% 20% 5%
High 60% 30% 10%
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scale up the uncertainty-based diﬃculty gradually in order to
investigate the eﬀect of increasing uncertainty on strategy choice,
information foraging, and the appearance of biases. As stated
in the hypotheses, it was expected that altering the underlying
feature probabilities and increasing uncertainty would lead to
an increase in information foraging and satisfaction of search
threshold, as well as the emergence of negativity bias. The second
third of the order was intended to assess the rate at which
subjects would adapt to a gradually decreasing uncertainty under
their previous expectation derived from the trend of increasing
uncertainty, which was expected to reverse the hypothesized
increase in information foraging behavior and other changes in
formal strategizing. The ﬁnal third of the condition order was
used to assist in testing for order eﬀects and to incorporate more
unpredictable jumps in uncertainty level between blocks.
Subjects were required to choose a feature (color, numerosity,
or shape) of the presented cards that they believed to be in
compliance with a particular rule (Figure 1). Each feature in
a rule set had a probability associated with it. A feature set
was randomly assigned to a probability at the beginning of the
experiment and again each time a criterion for successful trials
was met. This criterion was a percentage of correct answers out
of the most recent 10 trials (see Table 2). For example, in a Low
uncertainty block, subjects who chose correctly on at least 8 of
10 trials received a rule change. To reduce the predictability of
set shifts, assessments did not begin until a randomly selected
number of trials (i.e., between 10 and 15) had elapsed since the
last block change or feature set shift.
In an eﬀort to assess subjects’ preference for foraging behavior
to cope with the uncertainty of their task, subjects had the option
to “Observe” rather than choosing one of the three cards during
each trial. In this case, the subject forewent selecting one of
the choice cards for that trial by observing, at which point a
choice card was selected at random and the subject was informed
what the card was and whether or not it followed the rule. By
using Observe, subjects had a chance of collecting information
about the rule until they were able to reduce their own level of
uncertainty enough to select cards on their own. In essence, an
Observe trial could be used to obtain information, but resulted
in a loss of potential points. Alternatively, an Observe trial could
be used to spare the subject from losses. The ﬁrst block did not
feature the Observe option, as it was meant to provide subjects
with practice for the fundamental task and to determine whether
they had fully understood the instructions.
The pWCST software interface (Figure 1) consisted of a
reference card and three clickable cards that subjects chose from
during each game. If a subject selected a card that matched the
correct feature of the reference card, they received two points.
TABLE 2 | Block order/Criterion for WCST.
Uncertainty Block order Criterion
No 1, 7, 10 90% correct
Low 2, 6, 11 80% correct
Moderate 3, 5, 8 65% correct
High 4, 9 50% correct
Two points were taken away for each incorrect answer. The
graphical user interface allowed subjects to see the percent of the
task that they had completed, the block they were in, their total
score, the reference and chosen card from the previous game,
and the points received on the previous game. Subjects advanced
through trials at their own pace, with the majority ﬁnishing both
behavioral tasks in 60–90 min.
Unless otherwise speciﬁed, all reported p-values were derived
using the two-sample Kolmogorov–Smirnov hypothesis test
(refer to MATLAB kstest2). Because these p-values were based on
multiple comparisons, the signiﬁcance threshold was Bonferroni
corrected by dividing 0.05 by the number of comparisons.
RESULTS
Score
Subject performance varied depending on the level of
uncertainty, as revealed by the average score per uncertainty level
[see Figure 2A and Supplementary Tables S1–S3] and average
score per block (see Figure 2B and Supplementary Tables S4–S6].
The score per block averaged over all 60 subjects was signiﬁcantly
diﬀerent between the four uncertainty levels (p < 0.001), with
higher uncertainty associated with lower, often negative, scores.
Observe Use
We analyzed Observe use in order to quantify how changes in
uncertainty level could aﬀect satisfaction of search thresholds.
Search behavior, or information foraging, was assessed as use of
the Observe option, a means of collecting information regarding
the feature rule without risking points. Typical subject behavior
was altered by changes in uncertainty level, as revealed by the
number of times the Observe option was used in blocks of
each uncertainty level (see Figure 3 and Supplementary Tables
S7–S9). The number of trials in which Observe was used in
a block increased with uncertainty level (see Figure 3A), and
comparisons of No vs. Moderate (p = 0.006), No vs. High
(p < 0.001) and Low vs. High (p = 0.002) uncertainty were
found to be signiﬁcant. To examine how subjects used Observe
to gain knowledge about the task structure, we compared the
amount of Observe trials during the ﬁrst and second halves (25
trials each) of each block (see Figure 3B and Supplementary
Table S10). Although no comparisons between the ﬁrst and
second halves of a block were shown to be signiﬁcant, there
was an existing trend indicating that Observe trials were more
common in the second half than the ﬁrst half of a block in
most blocks, suggesting a subject preference to perform their own
sampling within a new block before resorting to Observe use.
This diﬀerence in Observe usage increased alongside increasing
uncertainty and decreased with decreasing uncertainty. Taking
the number of Observes per block as insight into information
foraging behavior, these results support the hypothesized increase
in the satisfaction of search threshold at higher uncertainty
levels.
To further measure how Observe usage changed over time
and uncertainty level, we measured the runs of consecutive
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FIGURE 1 | Screenshot of probabilistic WCST (pWCST) GUI. On a given trial, subjects would choose between one of the three cards on the bottom, attempting
to match the rule of common feature between the reference card and the target. Two points were received for each choice matching the rule, and two points were
taken for any choice that did not match the rule on that given trial. Alternatively, subjects could click the Observe button in order to simulate a trial, in which a target
card was randomly chosen and presented to the subject along with the score they would have received had they chosen it, with no actual point gain or loss.
Observe usage (see Figure 4 and Supplementary Tables S11–
S16), which here is deﬁned by the number of trials in a
row a subject chose to Observe rather than picking one
of the three cards. As shown in Figure 4, average number
of Observe runs increased with both uncertainty (compare
rows of Figure 4) and time (compare columns of Figure 4),
although the only comparison that reached signiﬁcance under
a two-sample Kolmogorov–Smirnov test was that of the ﬁrst
and second presentations of the Low condition (Blocks 2
and 6 in Figure 4; p < 0.015). In accordance with the
previously discussed results, this increase in runs of Observe
usage also comments on satisfaction of search, which rose
over time alongside score (see Figure 2B), suggesting more
accurate performance during non-Observe trials based on a
more extensive collection of information over the length of a
block.
Win-Stay-Lose-Shift (WSLS) Strategy
Win-Stay-Lose-Shift usage was sensitive to the level of
uncertainty and the order of blocks. The uncertainty level
and the block order aﬀected the use of Win-Stay and Lose-Shift
behavior (Figure 5 and Supplementary Tables S17–S28). The
signiﬁcant dominant strategy was found to be Win-Stay (i.e.,
choosing the same feature after a win), for win trials and
Lose-Shift (i.e., choosing a diﬀerent feature after a loss) for lose
trials over all blocks (p < 0.001). While no signiﬁcant order
eﬀects exist, a trend of increasing Win-Stay usage over time for
all uncertainty levels was observed, excepting for the second
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FIGURE 2 | Average score per block by uncertainty. Average score
decreased as the block uncertainty level increased. In (A), the x-axis is
grouped by uncertainty level. In (B), blocks along the x-axis are arranged in
the order in which they were presented to subjects. Bars denote the standard
error.
Moderate and Low blocks. On average, Win-Stay and Lose-Shift
strategy use decreased with increasing uncertainty, and this eﬀect
was signiﬁcant for comparisons between No and Moderate,
No and High, and Low and High uncertainty levels for both
Win-Stay and Lose-Shift, as well as Low and Moderate Win-Stay
(Lose-Shift Low vs. High: p< 0.006; all others: p< 0.001).
For some comparisons, blocks of high uncertainty were found
to bias future behavior. The proportion of trials in which a
Win-Stay strategy was used in the second Moderate and Low
uncertainty blocks was lower than that of the other presentations
of Moderate and Low uncertainty blocks (see Figure 5). This
eﬀect was found to be signiﬁcant in the comparison between
the second and third presentations of the Moderate uncertainty
level (p < 0.001), and was expected as a likely consequence of
the experienced high uncertainty in the High block persisting to
devalue reliability of conﬁrmatory evidence in proceeding blocks,
coupled with the subjects’ lack of knowledge that the uncertainty
level would decrease rather that increase over time.
A similar order eﬀect was found in Lose-Shift strategy.
However, in contrast to Win-Stay, the proportion of Lose-Shift
trials did not show as dramatic of a change over time between
presentations of the same uncertainty level (Figure 5). There was
a signiﬁcant decrease in Lose-Shift usage from the ﬁrst to second
presentations in Low uncertainty blocks (p < 0.001). There was
also a substantial, but not statistically signiﬁcant, decrease in
Lose-Shift usage from the ﬁrst to the second presentations of the
Moderate uncertainty blocks. This behavior, similar to patterns
of usage for Win-Stay, appears to be a consequence of lowered
informational reliability from the High uncertainty block.
Probability Matching
We analyzed subjects’ choice behavior to see if they attempted
to match the underlying distribution of rules rather than a
normative strategy such as always choosing the most likely
feature. Subject feature selection was averaged over each block
to derive rule choice percentages. Feature selection percentages
were calculated by dividing the number of times subjects
selected the Top, Middle, and Bottom probability features by the
number of non-Observe trials per block to obtain proportions
(Figures 6A,C, and Supplementary Tables S29 and S30). An
additional analysis was conducted that used only the last 10 trials
excluding Observes before a rule shift using the same metric, the
window imposed by the rule shifting mechanism’s threshold for
analyzing correct responses (Figures 6B,D, and Supplementary
Tables S31 and S32). These data were compared with the ground
truth probability distributions that were established prior to the
experiment (see Table 1). Results showed that the probability of
selecting the Top, Middle, and Bottom feature roughly followed
the ground truth probability distribution. Rather than choosing
the highest percentage feature, Top rule selection decreased with
increasing uncertainty.
To further examine the use of probability matching behavior,
comparisons between uncertainty levels were made on the last
10 trials. Using a one-sample t-test, 10-trial uncertainty-wise
comparisons showed that the Top rule was signiﬁcantly diﬀerent
from the ground truth probability distribution only during
No uncertainty (p < 0.001), the Middle rule was signiﬁcantly
diﬀerent from the ground truth probability distribution during
No, Moderate and the third presentation of Low uncertainty
(p < 0.001), and Bottom was signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from the
ground truth probability distribution only during the ﬁrst
presentations of No, Low, and High uncertainty, as well as the
third presentation of No uncertainty (p < 0.001; Figure 6D). In
the 10-trial analysis, subject rule selection was only universally
diﬀerent from the ground truth probability distribution for all
rules during the No uncertainty condition. Taken together, these
results suggest that subjects did tend to probability match rather
than an optimal Top rule selection.
Over/Under-Selection
Overselection, in the case of this experiment, is deﬁned as
choosing low probability rules at a signiﬁcantly higher probability
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FIGURE 3 | Average Observe use per block by uncertainty. (A) Average
Observe usage increased alongside increasing block uncertainty. (B) Observe
usage per half-block by uncertainty. Observe usage largely increased during
the second half of each block. This gap increased along with increasing
uncertainty and decreased with decreasing uncertainty, in some blocks even
causing usage in the first half to overtake the second half. In (A), the x-axis is
grouped by uncertainty level. In (B), blocks along the x-axis are arranged in
the order in which they were presented to subjects. Bars denote the standard
error.
than the ground truth, and underselection is similarly deﬁned
as choosing high probability rules to a less often than the
ground truth. We analyzed all trials and 10-trial block-wise data
for similarity to ground truth. Using a one-sample t-test, all-
trial block-wise rule selection proportions, with the exception
of Middle/High, were signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from base rule
percentages (Mid/Mod1: p < 0.005, Mid/Mod2: p < 0.005,
Mid/Mod3 < 0.005; all others: p < 0.001; Figure 6C). Subject
usage of the Top rule universally fell under the ground truth,
while selection of the Bottom rule was always more frequent
than the ground truth. Subject usage of the Middle rule fell
over ground truth, but this diﬀerence declined with increasing
uncertainty until the diﬀerence was not signiﬁcant. These results
provide evidence for underselection of the Top probability rule
alongside overselection of the Bottom probability rule.
DISCUSSION
In the present study, we showed that a probabilistic version of
WCST with a means of information foraging is an eﬀective tool
for evaluating compensatory biases and suboptimal strategizing
related to rational choice in economic decision-making. Through
analysis of feature selection, it was clear that Win-Stay Lose-
Shift and Probability Matching behaviors were the most prevalent
strategies. The principal ﬁndings were that: (1) the threshold for
satisfaction of search increased with uncertainty (Figures 3 and 4),
(2) negativity bias occurred in trials following periods of high
uncertainty (Figures 3 and 5), and (3) while subjects followed the
trends of probability matching behavior, subjects also persisted
in underselecting the Top probability rule while overselecting
the Bottom probability rule (Figure 6). These ﬁndings address
the relationship between uncertainty and the prevalence of
biased and suboptimal selection behavior, a ﬁeld with potential
applications in the development of cognitive technologies and
improving the decision-making techniques of human operators.
Through the incorporation of information foraging using an
Observe option, satisfaction of search bias was demonstrated
in the present study. The use of the Observe button increased
with increasing uncertainty, indicating that the threshold for a
subject’s satisfaction of search (Fleck et al., 2010), or the amount
of information a subject must collect before they are conﬁdent
enough to take action in their current circumstances, similarly
increased as hypothesized. This increase in Observe usage can be
explained both as an avoidance tactic for losing points when the
rule has a high degree of ambiguity, and as an attempt to learn a
probability rule by collecting more information under conditions
of high uncertainty. The relatively low Observe usage in lower
uncertainty blocks may be the result of a lower satisfaction
of search threshold or high conﬁdence level. When analyzing
the length of trials in which Observe was used consecutively,
referred to as a “run,” number of runs increased for both
uncertainty level and block order (Figure 4). This trend also
supports the increase of a subject’s satisfaction of search threshold
with higher uncertainty levels, but also indicates that subjects
may be attempting to prevent further losses later on in the
game by Observing more. By increasing the number of Observe
runs in later blocks, subjects appear to behave according to an
exploration paradigm in order to ensure they have the correct
rule at multiple time points before risking their point reserve by
participating in trials.
In the analysis of the prevalence of Observe usage during the
ﬁrst and second halves of a block, it was revealed that Observe
usage was typically higher during the second half of a block,
although this trend reverses in trials that follow presentations of
High uncertainty blocks (Figure 3B). It is likely that the normal
trend speaks to the subjects’ preference to attempt to exploit their
own theories in a new block before resorting to Observe usage
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FIGURE 4 | Run length of Observe usage by all subjects per block. Blocks are grouped horizontally by presentation number of each uncertainty level, and
vertically by uncertainty level. The title numbers indicate the true block order as experienced by the subjects. The length of the tail, and thus the average length of
runs of Observe trials, increased both with increasing uncertainty and successive presentations of each uncertainty level.
to explore other options. The exception that occurred within
the second presentations of Moderate and Low uncertainty
blocks was likely a holdover following the ﬁrst presentation
of the High uncertainty block. Subjects did not yet know that
uncertainty could decrease over time, andmay have kept foraging
for information in preparation for a higher uncertainty future.
This behavior is indicative of an increase in risk aversion that
led to an artiﬁcially increased level of satisfaction of search in
lower uncertainty blocks as a result of the previously experienced
higher uncertainty blocks. Furthermore, this result corroborates
the observation that humans tend to shift to an information-
seeking strategy when considering longer horizons for overall
rewards (Wilson et al., 2014).
Negativity bias, or the tendency to remember negative
feedback more strongly than positive (Rozin and Royzman,
2001), can be seen through increased risk-avoidance behavior
that appeared after an increase in negative feedback. For example,
the relatively slow (two block) return to a previous levels ofWSLS
following the ﬁrst diﬃcult, High uncertainty block suggests a
negativity bias (see Figure 5) in that subjects’ decisions were less
likely to be inﬂuenced by conﬁrmatory evidence and consistently
select reinforced feature choices. Furthermore, this bias led to
a substantial increase in Observe usage between the ﬁrst and
second presentations of Moderate uncertainty and a substantial
decrease in score between the ﬁrst and second presentations
of Low uncertainty (see Figure 3B). As discussed in regard to
satisfaction of search, the increase in Observe usage for higher
uncertainty conditions supports the hypothesized evocation of
negativity bias, as subjects may have opted for observing trials
after experiencing a large degree of negative feedback as a result
of their choices (see Figure 3A). Additionally, the ﬁnding that
Observe usage is higher in the second half of a block other than
in the two blocks directly following the ﬁrst presentation of the
High uncertainty condition is in support of a negativity bias (see
Figure 3B). After experiencing a large degree of loss during the
ﬁrst half of a block, a subject may have made use of the Observe
option more often in the second half of the block to prevent
more loss. It might be that the feeling of loss persists from the
end of the High uncertainty block through the beginning of
the following blocks, creating a desire to prevent further losses
until the underlying probabilities of the new block are better
understood. Although this trend was observed, it would be of
interest to conduct a follow-up study that utilizes more blocks in
order to see the shift from high to low uncertainty enough times
to conﬁrm this theory with a higher signiﬁcance level.
A trend indicative of over- and under-selection emerged
regarding subject choice percentages for the Top, Middle,
and Bottom probability features (Table 1) as a factor of
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FIGURE 5 | Win-Stay and Lose-Shift use by uncertainty. “Win-Stay” bars denote the percentage of Win-Stay behavior out of all trials in which the subject chose
the correct rule, while “Lose-Shift” bars denote the percentage of Lose-Shift behavior out of all trials in which the subject chose incorrectly.Bars denote the standard
error and x-axis is arranged in the order the blocks were presented (Table 2).
uncertainty level. Subjects tended to overselect the Bottom
feature, and underselect the Top feature across all uncertainty
levels at a relatively consistent rate (see Figure 6). Subjects
likely experienced trials in which the Bottom feature appeared
commonly enough in the small sampling of trials to lead subjects
to perceive their frequency as higher than the base truth. While
the explanation for this result is not unequivocally clear, there are
a few potential factors that may, by themselves or collectively,
have resulted in the trends seen in the data. It is possible that
an eﬀect such as representativeness, the tendency to underselect
and overselect as a result of small trial size and uncertainty
(Tversky and Kahneman, 1974), could have led to this result.
The most conservative explanation is that this eﬀect was caused
by noise in the data (Erev et al., 1994; Hilbert, 2012; Costello
and Watts, 2014), perhaps due to feature choice error or the
random sampling of features in lieu of a more concrete strategy.
However, due to the consistency of this eﬀect between subjects, it
is unlikely that the identiﬁed eﬀect could be completely described
by noise. Moreover, if the eﬀect was primarily due to noise, the
deviation from the ground truth probability at high uncertainty
levels should have led to increased random searching, which was
not the case. Building slightly from this conservative explanation,
it is possible that the uncertainty itself is the reason for the
trend, given that a higher level of uncertainty leads to a longer
feature sampling period as it becomes more diﬃcult to identify
the Top rule while experiencing a high degree of information
obfuscating belief formation. As an intermediary view between
noise and bias, Gigerenzer (1991) posits the idea that, while the
apparent trends in the data exist, they do not necessarily signify
violations of probabilistic reasoning. In a similar view posed by
Haselton, such trends are characterized as the result of “design
features” rather than “design ﬂaws” (Haselton et al., 2005).
Under this notion, the tactics exhibited by the subjects instead
identify fundamental properties of probability and statistical
theory in a situation involving varying degrees of uncertainty
in task feedback. Building upon the ideas of Simon (1972),
Gigerenzer provides additional applicable work concerning the
idea of “bounded rational” strategizing, or the use of strategies
that can be considered rational within the conﬁnes of a task.
Given the uncertainty inherent in the pWCST, it is a further
possibility that the identiﬁed trend falls under the category of a
bounded rational strategy (Gigerenzer and Goldstein, 1996). As
discussed below, one of our future plans is to develop an optimal
model that could be compared to subject behavior in the pWCST.
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FIGURE 6 | Subject feature matching vs. ground truth probability distribution averaged over all non-Observe trials for all blocks of each uncertainty
level for all subjects. Solid lines indicate subjects’ choice percentages for the Top, Middle, and Bottom probability rules averaged over all trials of the No, Low,
Mod, and High conditions. The dashed lines indicate the base rule frequency of the Top, Middle, and Bottom rules during each condition (see Table 1). (A) Feature
matching percentages averaged over all non-Observe trials for each uncertainty level. (B) Feature matching percentages averaged over the last 10 trials (excluding
Observes) before a rule shift (i.e., probability set to feature matchup scrambled) for each uncertainty level. (C) Feature matching percentages averaged over all
non-Observe trials for each block. (D) Feature matching percentages averaged over the last 10 trials (excluding Observes) before a rule shift. Bars denote the
standard error.
Such a model could provide more concrete support for one of
these theories in explaining under- and over-selection of rules
under uncertainty.
Perhaps the most interesting aspect of the subject choice
percentage data is the trend of the Middle probability feature.
Initially, the Middle probability feature, much like the Bottom
probability feature, is overselected. However, as the uncertainty
level increases, this overselection gradually tapers oﬀ until
the selection percentage nearly matches the ground truth. It
is possible that this result speaks to a threshold at which a
probability becomes just substantial enough that it no longer
falls prey to the bias that causes it. We predict that, in the
pWCST paradigm, that threshold would fall at 33%, the uniform
distribution given three feature choices. In the current paradigm,
the Middle feature fell just short of that in the High uncertainty
condition at 30%, and as would be expected, averaged subject
selection of this feature was just above the ground truth
probability distribution in this uncertainty level. In order to
reveal more concrete evidence for this theory, in future work,
we would like to add another uncertainty level to this paradigm
in which all three features are at uniform probability. It would
also be helpful in the future to design a model capable of playing
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the pWCST in an eﬀort to make a ﬁrm assessment of baseline
performance within each probability level, given the ambiguous
nature of this particular result.
Lastly, probability matching behavior (Wozny et al., 2010)
was observed in the analysis of overall strategy usage. Subjects
feature choices roughly mirrored the ground truth probability
distribution in trend in the 10-trial analysis (Figure 6B), with a
shift for over/underselection in the all-trials analysis (Figure 6A).
This ﬁnding indicates that rather than utilizing the optimal
strategy of always selecting the Top probability feature, subjects
favored selecting the features based on what they knew of their
underlying ground truth probability distribution. An alternative
explanation is that the variability seen in the data is caused
by feature exploration, as subjects will need to test hypotheses
by switching between the features before deciding upon their
most rewarding rule. In order to address this possibility, we
analyzed the probability matching data for just the last 10 trials
before a rule shift occurred, with the rationale being that the
subject needed to reach a high percentage of correct feature
choices in order to engage the rule change, suggesting that
they had at that point solidiﬁed their strategy. Even in the 10-
trial analysis, not only did subjects still eschew the optimal
strategy in favor of probability matching, but their choices
more closely matched the probability matching strategy than
with the overall data. This ﬁnding provides strong evidence
for the presence of this cognitive bias under varying levels of
uncertainty.
There is the possibility that some of the biases found in
this paper, especially the over/underselection of rules, may more
conservatively fall under the explanation of noise in the data
(Erev et al., 1994; Hilbert, 2012; Costello andWatts, 2014). While
the explanations presented above serve as potential causes for
the trends observed, we do recognize the possible eﬀects of
noise or other potential explanations for the consistent trends
in behavior across subjects leading to potentially suboptimal
decision-making. While we cannot know the exact strategy,
motivation, and perceptual acuity the subjects exhibited during
these blocks, the trends of irrational and occasionally detrimental
gameplay strategies that are evident in the collected data suggest
the explanation that to some degree, subjects were under the
inﬂuence of biases and suboptimal strategizing that prevented
them from behaving rationally as dictated by the tenets of Game
Theory (Zagare, 1984). However, the not yet unambiguated
nature of these conclusions invites further investigation into
the underlying causes for the patterns of behavior exhibited by
subjects performing the pWCST.
The present study introduces a variation of the well-
known WCST to examine biases, strategy usage, and decision-
making under uncertain conditions. This study sought to
expand upon previous experiments using the WCST and
similar decision-making tasks to investigate uncertainty-related
changes in behavior in subjects. The two primary extensions
to the WCST are the introduction of uncertainty in the
form of probabilistic feature selection, and the option to
“Observe” a trial by allowing the computer to select a card
for the user, showing them the outcome with no change to
their score. These initial ﬁndings suggest that the present
pWCST can evoke interesting deviations from normative
behaviors.
The results of the pWCST task support the assertion that
under increasing degrees of uncertainty, people tend to respond
with a decreasing capacity for optimal decision-making behavior.
However, there are a few modiﬁcations to the present paradigm
going forward that would add to its statistical power and
investigative scope. In future experiments using this task, it
would be desirable to query further self-report data in order to
elucidate the subject’s mental state when performing the pWCST
to form stronger conclusions regarding the reasons behind the
biases that were evident in the data. The lack of self-report data
is a limitation of the current study, and stronger conclusions
might have been formed regarding biases had this data been
collected. As mentioned above, we were limited by the number of
uncertainty levels and recommend that future studies investigate
additional uncertainty levels that staircase down to a uniform
probability distribution, 33/33/33, in order to test the hypothesis
that over/underestimation has a threshold, perhaps adding a
shallower gradient between uncertainty levels for more accurate
identiﬁcation.
In regard to the discussion of over and underselection of
features, the strategies taken by our subjects might be better
understood if compared with an optimal computer model that
played the pWCST. This is something we plan to explore in
the future. Such a model would provide a better baseline for
human subject performance in an eﬀort to better assess the
validity of claims about subject strategizing in the present study
and might support conclusions about the presence of cognitive
biases. Using performance data from the model, we would
be able to comment on how each bias behaves in isolation,
in the presence of other trends and biases, and the eﬀects it
would have onmemory for future decision-making. Additionally,
we would be able to distinguish, depending on whether the
model outperformed subjects or roughly approximated their
results, whether human performance on the pWCST could be
considered bounded rational (Gigerenzer andGoldstein, 1996) or
suboptimal. Another further analysis that could provide insight
into the validity of cognitive biases in the data is minimum
description length modeling (MDL; Rissanen, 1983). Typically
used in order to provide support for one theory among many
that exist to encapsulate a trend found in data, MDL would
be well-suited for disambiguating the aforementioned results,
particularly regarding the over and underselection of features,
which has been shown to have varying potential explanations.
An additional bias that might ﬁt within the scope of the
paradigm is conﬁrmation bias. Conﬁrmation bias is the practice
of seeking out information that conﬁrms one’s prior beliefs
rather than testing disproving information in an attempt to
elucidate the ground truth in a situation (Nickerson, 1998; Doll
et al., 2011). While the conﬁrmation bias may have been an
adaptive shortcut that increased human survival by enabling
expedient development of heuristics, this bias can also lead
to either incomplete or incorrect perceptions of the world in
many circumstances (Klayman, 1995).We have previously shown
that satisfaction of search can work in conjunction with the
conﬁrmation bias to lower the threshold at which a subject
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stops foraging for information (Phillips et al., 2014). This bias
could be tested within pWCST by the addition of the ability to
choose which feature is being used in Observe trials like in the
paradigm utilized in Navarro and Newell (2014), instead of that
feature being randomly selected. Conﬁrmation bias would be a
natural extension for this paradigm because, unlike the WCST,
the pWCST, especially at high levels of uncertainty, would lead
subjects to believe that low probability features aremore common
than they are as a result of conclusions based on a small sampling
of trials.
Going forward, pWCST serves as a suitable platform for
continuing to investigate biases and suboptimal strategies that
are not commonly evoked by the traditional WCST, such
as those described in this paper, as well as conﬁrmation
bias given the alterations described above. pWCST also holds
potential use in investigating the tradeoﬀ between balancing
of information foraging and trial and error strategizing.
The pWCST in its current form allowed for understanding
when subjects were foraging for information or testing
their hypotheses of the task structure. The revised Observe
mechanism proposed above would make the held beliefs of
the subject clearer, allowing a tighter investigation of when
and how information foraging transpires. Gaining a clear
understanding of the ways in which humans engage in
suboptimal strategizing and the mechanisms that cause them to
arise holds importance in a variety of applied positions, such as
reducing human operator error, improving adaptive educational
software, and modeling cognitive processes for medical and
research applications.
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